Volume 44
Issue 2 Spring 2004
Spring 2004

What's a Poor Land Trust to Do - Alternatives for Dealing with an
Opportunistic World
Susan F. French

Recommended Citation
Susan F. French, What's a Poor Land Trust to Do - Alternatives for Dealing with an Opportunistic World, 44
Nat. Resources J. 563 (2004).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol44/iss2/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.

SUSAN F. FRENCH*

What's a Poor Land Trust to Do?
Alternatives for Dealing with an
Opportunistic World
Christopher Elmendorf's article, "Securing Ecological Investments on Other People's Land," raises the question whether a prudent
land trust, or other conservation organization, can undertake a program
of active ecological rehabilitation and management without acquiring fee
simple title to the land.
To explore the problem, Elmendorf posits a scenic rural
community that is beginning to experience some pressure to sell land for
development of second homes. The primary land uses in the community
are farming, ranching, and small-scale timber production. Most of the
land in private hands is still owned by long-term residents. Much of that
land has ecological value that could be considerably enhanced by
rehabilitation efforts and considerably degraded by second-home andpresumably-other kinds of development.
In Elmendorf's hypothetical community, a land trust wants to
protect the ecological function now served by land in the community
and "restore it to ecological glory."1 I take it this means that the land
trust wants to prevent any further development in the community,
except perhaps for agricultural or recreational uses, and to restore
streams and wetlands, native vegetation, and habitat for wildlife that
may once have occupied the property. Once this has been done, the trust
wants to ensure that its investment has enduring conservation value.
I. ADVANTAGES TO LAND TRUST OF ACQUIRING A FEE
SIMPLE
From a legal standpoint, the simplest way to accomplish the land
trust's goals would be for the land trust to buy all the land in the
community and do the restoration work, either itself or through
contractors. The land trust could then lease the land or license others to
use it for purposes that would not interfere with the conservation project
and that would give the land trust the maximum economic and/or
social-political return on its investment above and beyond the ecological
values generated by the land.
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
1. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Securing Ecological Investments on Other People's Land: A
Transaction-CostsPerspective,44 NAT. RESOURcES J.529 (2004).
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If farming, ranching, or logging is initially, or later becomes, a
compatible use, the land trust can lease the land to people who are
interested in carrying on those activities, including the former owners.
Through reservations and covenants in the lease, the land trust can
retain the right to conduct whatever activities it chooses on the land
during the lease term. In addition, the trust can restrict the lessee's
activities so that they do not interfere with either the ongoing
rehabilitation work or the ecological functions performed by the land. If
the lessee violates the lease covenants, legal relief through lease
termination and eviction is readily available.
Short-term leases 2 would give the land trust maximum flexibility
to take advantage of knowledge gained through its "adaptive
management" of the site, 3 changing the covenants of each successive
lease to reflect knowledge gained during the previous leases. Short-term
leases would also provide the opportunity to fine-tune the rent. In each
lease term, the trust could charge a rent that reflects the then-current
value of the property for uses compatible with the land trust's ecological
purposes (including discounts it might find useful to enhance the
likelihood of cooperative behavior on the part of the tenant). If the land
trust's investment makes the land more valuable for the lessee's activity,
the land trust would be able to capture the added value in the next lease
period. Similarly, the shortness of the lease term provides assurance to
the lessee that the land trust is not likely to be tempted to reduce the
lessee's allowed activity (at least without compensation) even if it learns
that some aspects of the operation are incompatible with the ecology
project (a risk it may run in a long-term arrangement).
Although short-term leases provide the best opportunities for
maintaining equilibrium in value to both lessor and lessee, longer-term
leases may be needed to induce current landowners to embrace the
project, to gain political support for the project, or for other reasons. If so,
commercial leases provide ample precedents for devices that build
flexibility into long-term leases. Lease covenants may provide for
adjustments in rent and for adjustments in terms regarding use of the
premises in accordance with predetermined standards. Covenants may
also provide for renegotiation of the lease through a predetermined
process. The absence of readily available, easy-to-apply standards
against which to predict possible changes in the ecological-rehabilitation
context suggests that land trusts would find renegotiation provisions
more saleable than standards.
2.
3.

By this I mean leases of up to five years or so.
Elmendorf, supra note 1, at 534.
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Simultaneously, or alternatively, with leasing the land for
agricultural purposes, owning the fee simple would free the land trust to
open up the land for other uses to the extent it deemed desirable for the
general good and for garnering political support. Subject to some
constraints imposed by the need to retain goodwill and political support,
the land trust could issue licenses for recreational and educational uses
compatible with the goals of the trust while reserving the right to revoke
the licenses or change the terms of use to meet current needs for
ecological protection. Of all the legal devices for sharing use of land, the
license leaves the most flexibility in the fee owner.
In addition to giving the land trust full control of the terms on
which others may use the land, which makes it relatively easy to protect
ecological functions of the land and to secure and exploit the value
created by its investment, fee simple ownership gives the land trust
complete flexibility to deal with future change. If the rehabilitation
investment does not work out, or if the trust decides that the land should
be freed up for some other use, the land trust can sell the land or
otherwise dispose of it. Since the trust has a full and unencumbered fee,
there is no dead-hand control.
Despite the simplicity and advantages of fee simple ownership,
it is often not practical and may not be efficient. Buying a fee simple may
require a lot more money than buying a servitude4 for ecological
rehabilitation and protection purposes and would certainly be more
expensive - at least in the short run - than making short-term contracts
for the same purposes. If the land trust can accomplish its objectives
without acquiring a fee, through cheaper contracts or servitudes, it can
accomplish more ecological restoration for the same dollar investment.
In calculating the difference in outlay required for a fee rather than a
conservation servitude, it should be noted that there may not be much
difference in the availability of tax subsidies. Like the landowner who
donates a conservation servitude, the landowner who sells the fee to a
land trust for a below-market price may be able to take a charitable
deduction (measured by the difference between fair market value and
the sale price). In addition, the landowner may be able to avoid realizing
capital gains on the sale if the land trust buys another property of
comparable market but lower ecological value and exchanges it for the
ecologically valuable parcel. But, even with public assistance through tax
subsidies, the land trust may not be able to raise enough money to buy
all the land it needs for its project.

4. Buying a conservation servitude is cheaper than buying a fee simple because title
and the right to make all uses not inconsistent with the servitude remain with the seller.
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There are other problems with the fee-simple solution. Landowner resistance may be substantial. If the landowners sell out to the
land trust, they face several choices. They may remain in the community
and become lessees of land they formerly owned, in which case they
forgo control and possible future appreciation in the value of their land.
Alternatively, they may use the proceeds to move to another community
where they can buy land and carry on similar activities, to change
occupations, or to retire, or some combination of these. But the
landowners may not want to do any of these things, even if they are
offered fair market value for their land, or even if they are offered a
premium price. In Elmendorf's hypothetical community, the landowners
are attached to their land and apparently are not willing to sell. Even if
the landowners were willing and the land trust had enough resources to
make the purchase, the land trust still might not want to pursue the fee
5
simple solution for political reasons.
Even if the land trust had the money to buy and the landowners
were generally willing to sell, and there were not insurmountable
political problems with making the purchase, the land trust would still
face the problem of negotiating with multiple landowners, each of whom
has an incentive to hold out for the highest price. This problem is the
same whether the land trust wants to buy a fee simple or a conservation
servitude.
II. ALTERNATIVES TO ACQUIRING A FEE SIMPLE
So we come to the problem Elmendorf addresses. If a land trust
the fee simple, what can it do? Elmendorf explores several
buy
cannot
possibilities.
A. Short-Term Contracts
Short-term contracts, like short-term leases, provide maximum
flexibility to adapt to change. Each contract is negotiated in light of the
conditions then existing. The land trust can negotiate for the right to
carry out (or have the owner carry out) activities that produce the best
ecological return and restrict those that cause harm to the ecological

5. Or even for reasons of efficiency. Elmendorf suggests that the current owner may
have a special talent for cultivating food or timber. He does not explain why that talent
cannot be put to as good a use if the land is leased back to the current owner, but it may be
that fee-simple owners generally do better than lessees- though if the lease is long enough
to allow the lessee to reap the value of its investments in the land, that does not seem very
likely. Certainly, much agricultural and timbering activity is carried out on leased land.
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objectives. The landowner can re-price its services and forgone
opportunities in light of then current values. But there is a fundamental
difference between this situation and our ideal (legal) solution: the
landowner may not have any deep interest in producing and
maintaining ecological value. This difference leads to two problems,
which Elmendorf describes as intra- and inter-contract opportunism.
First, during any contract term, the landowner may be tempted to shirk
or cheat by providing shoddy restoration services (if the trust has
contracted for the landowner to do the restoration work) or by failing to
limit its ecologically damaging activities to the agreed extent (the intracontract problem). Second, assuming the land trust wants to renew the
contract for an additional term, the landowner will be tempted to
demand a renewal price that reflects the ecological value of the property
at the time the new contract begins (the inter-contract problem).
Elmendorf concludes that the intra-contract problem can be
solved, or at least limited, by offering the landowner a sufficient
premium so that the landowner will have an incentive to do a good job
in the hopes of securing future similar contracts with the trust and
structuring the contract to reduce its exposure to landowner shirking.6
The inter-contract problem is more difficult because the current
ecological value of the land will include a component created by the land
trust's investment. Since the payoff from the land trust's investment is
much longer than the contract term -and in fact, most of the payoff will
come after expiration of the contract term -the land trust is vulnerable to
losing most of the value of its investment to the landowner unless the
landowner has sufficient other incentives to continue contracting with
the land trust on terms that allow it to make a sufficient return on its
investment to keep its donors happy. Elmendorf demonstrates quite
convincingly that this problem cannot be overcome without resorting to
legal devices other than short-term contracts.
From a legal standpoint, it is clear that short-term contracts
cannot work because accomplishing the land trust's objectives will
require curtailing over a long period of time the activities that can be
carried out on the land. The land trust needs to avoid putting the
landowner in a position where the landowner can capture an
unacceptable amount of the value created by the land trust's investment
in rehabilitation activities. To do that, the trust must severely curtail the
landowner's ability to back out of the arrangement. The land trust needs
a legal device that will

6. The land trust could reduce its exposure, for example, by reserving the right to
conduct restoration projects itself rather than contracting for the landowner to do these.
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" prevent further development of the land;
" allow the land trust to carry on rehabilitation activities; and
" restrict current and future uses that would interfere with
accomplishing the land trust's desired ecological objectives for
the length of time the land trust has in mind (which is probably
quite a long time, if not indefinitely).
B. Servitudes
Aside from ownership, the most promising device is the
servitude. The servitude leaves ownership with the private owner but
sets up an arrangement that gives the land trust rights that can continue
indefinitely against subsequent owners and occupiers of the land. A
servitude can give the land trust rights to enter the land to carry out a
program of ecological rehabilitation and to determine whether any
activities on the land interfere with accomplishing the objectives of its
rehabilitation program. A servitude can prevent further development of
the land and restrict indefinitely any current or future uses of the land
that would interfere with the land trust's desired ecological objectives. A
servitude can also impose affirmative obligations on both the landowner
and the land trust with respect to maintenance and investment in the
property and for future payments to be made by either party to the
other. Finally, the servitude can include other terms the parties might
find desirable, like the right to use the property for educational
purposes, dispute resolution procedures, renegotiation provisions, and
even termination provisions.
Although the law of servitudes has traditionally been quite
complicated and subject to odd gaps in enforceability, conservation
servitudes can be used today with a high degree of confidence. They
have received favorable legislative treatment in many states, and there is
every reason to believe that the common law will follow suit. The
Restatement, Third, of Property:Servitudes, published by the American Law

Institute in 2000, eliminates all the common law obstacles to conservation
servitudes that made the Uniform Conservation Easement Act necessary.
In addition to finding a legal device that will work, the land trust
has to offer landowners a deal they will accept. Elmendorf makes several
very useful suggestions about the way the trust can structure a proposed
deal to allay the fears of land owners while, at the same time, reducing
incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior:
* Offer a price to the landowner that will compensate for the loss
of development rights and curtailment of agricultural activities
on the land but structure the payment as an installment
payment over the life of the project;
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" Specify

activities that are curtailed to protect the ecological
function of the property but include a provision allowing the
land trust to specify additional activities that may later be
determined to interfere with the ecological project;
" Include a requirement that the land trust compensate the
landowner for any forgone income due to additional
restrictions on its activities; and
" Provide a dispute resolution procedure in the event they do
not agree on the appropriate level of compensation, which
procedure should provide fair representation of agriculturalists
among the decision makers to assure the landowner of
7
fairness.
Structuring the servitude to include these provisions strikes me
as an excellent idea. With these additions, the servitude described above,
with its provisions for allowing entry and use by the land trust and
indefinitely restricting incompatible uses of the land, should provide a
satisfactory substitute for acquiring ownership of the fee simple.
Although the terms of the servitude will bear some resemblance to the
terms that would be included in a long-term lease back to the former
owner, the servitude is somewhat more complicated and subject to
somewhat more risk of judicial unwillingness to enforce the arrangement
as intended than the fee simple. The servitude is close enough, however,
to the fee simple that a prudent land trust could use it as the basis for an
affirmative program of investment in ecological rehabilitation.
Elmendorf also discusses strategies related to using passive
conservation easements as "hands-tying bonds" and signaling
idiosyncratic preferences. 8 I was not persuaded by this part of the article.
To accomplish its objectives without acquiring the fee simple, the land
trust will have to use a combination of active and passive conservation
servitudes. An open space easement alone will not allow the land trust to
secure the value of its intended investments. As to the signaling
discussion, the signals he mentions might provide information that
would help the land trust decide how much to offer a landowner to enter
the program but could not safely be relied on to forgo creating a legally
binding arrangement that covered the desired life of the ecological
benefits the trust intended to create.

7. Elmendorf does not spell out just how this is to be accomplished, but providing
some sort of dispute resolution procedure that both sides would consider fair is an
excellent idea. It could usefully be applied to all aspects of the ongoing relationship
governed by the servitude.
8. Elmendorf, supra note 1, at Parts III.A.4 and III.A.5.
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III. LAND ASSEMBLY PROBLEMS
Having laid the groundwork for creating arrangements that
would allow a land trust to make satisfactory arrangements with
individual landowners, Elmendorf turns to the problem of enlisting all of
the land in the community in the program. This is a land assembly
problem similar to that faced by any developer that lacks the power of
eminent domain. Even if all landowners are willing to sell their
development rights and curtail their agricultural activities to the extent
necessary to secure the ecological benefits contemplated by the program,
they will have powerful incentives to engage in strategic behavior to
maximize their individual prices.
Elmendorf suggests two interesting strategies for combating this
problem. The first is using a terminable servitude until all the desired
parcels have been enrolled in the program. Under this servitude, the
land trust would retain the right to terminate the servitude and recover
the compensation it had paid to the landowner. This way, if the land
trust decided it had not acquired enough land in the area to make its
planned investment worthwhile, it could back out without having sunk
too much into the project. Although the use of terminable servitudes
could reduce the incidence of holdouts among landowners who find the
prospect of selling their development rights appealing, it would do
nothing to overcome the problem of landowners who do not want to sell.
For this problem, Elmendorf suggests the possibility of seeking
legislation that would authorize the creation of special districts for
conservation. If a certain percentage of landowners could be persuaded
that they wanted to sell their development rights and limit their activities
in the interests of environmental goals, they could be authorized to form
a special district that would have the power to subject all the land in the
district to the conservation program. Once the district was formed, the
land trust could negotiate a deal with the district rather than having to
negotiate with individual landowners.
Allowing the creation of special districts is appealing in that it
provides a way for the landowners to overcome collective-action
problems (assuming enough of them want to), and there is a model
readily at hand for the enabling legislation needed. Enabling legislation
for business improvement districts contains provisions for voting
requirements and procedures to protect minority interests, drawing
boundaries, and handling funds.9 But can the land trust persuade
9. Elmendorf's proposed special districts have quite a different function from a
business improvement district, however, which might raise constitutional problems. The
purpose of these special districts is to allow one group of landowners to impose a
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enough landowners that they want to create such a district? Why would
landowners want to give up their ability to negotiate individually?
Unlike the land assembly districts Michael Heller proposes as a way for
landowners to capture the surplus value created by assembly of their
parcels (now lost in condemnation proceedings)10 Elmendorf's proposed
special district is designed to prevent landowners from capturing the
surplus ecological value created by assembling their parcels for the
rehabilitation program. He suggests that enough landowners will want
to sell their development rights and be willing to submit to restrictions
on the way they carry on their agricultural activities that a credible threat
by the land trust to pull out of the community and take its conservation
dollars elsewhere will persuade them to create the special district. He
may be right about this, but I am somewhat dubious." He does not
mention marketing efforts by the land trust, but it may be implicit in his
approach that the trust would also be engaged in a deliberate attempt to
build support for its project by persuading the landowners that they
should want to participate in the program for the greater good. In
designing this effort, the land trust might find helpful the literature on
factors that lead people to engage in other-regarding behavior even
when it is not in their economic self-interest to do S0.12
In addition to providing the land trust with a single entity with
which it can negotiate, Elmendorf also claims that the existence of a
district will make short-term contracting more feasible. I am not
persuaded that a land trust could safely rely on a strategy of refusing to
pay holdup prices for contract renewal as a way of preventing land
conservation servitude and force a sale of development rights on land belonging to others
without the owners' consent. This looks like a delegation of the power of eminent domain
without the safeguard of a judicially established price or a determination of public use.
10. Michael A. Heller & Roderick M. Hills, The Art of Land Assembly (Draft, Jan. 9,
2003), availableat http://eres.lawlib.ucla.edu/coursepage.asp?cid=264 (last visited Apr. 12,
2004).
11. Elmendorf responds that the land trust can also offer some of the surplus
generated by reduced transaction costs. See Elmendorf, supra note 1, n.69. This may
sweeten the pot, but it will not overcome another potentially serious problem: what about
the landowners who really do not want to sell? Even though their neighbors are involved
in the coercion, the disaffected landowners may be able to generate substantial negative
publicity about the "land grab," which may create subsequent problems for the land trust.
And, of course, landowners concerned about environmental land grabs may succeed in
preventing passage of the legislation necessary to authorize creation of these special
districts.
12. In a very interesting paper, Lynn Stout reviews the findings from the social
sciences on the surprising quantity and predictability of human responses that value
cooperation and sharing resources more than maximizing one's wealth. See Lynn A. Stout,
Other-Regarding Behavior and the Law (Draft, Oct. 4, 2002), availableat http://eres.lawlib.
ucla.edu/coursepage.asp?cid=264, (last visited Apr. 12, 2004).
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owners from walking away from the conservation program altogether. I
do not see how having a district solves the problem. If enough landowners become unhappy with the restrictions on their activities, or on
their ability to realize the appreciation in value of their lands, what is to
stop them from collectively demanding a renewal price that captures all
or most of the gain from the land trust's investment? Or, if their land has
appreciated in value for other purposes, what is to stop them from
demanding a renewal price that reflects its value for development?
Absent a servitude that binds them to the conservation program, the
landowners are likely to defect unless they are truly committed to the
conservation program. Even if the current generation is committed, their
successors may not be. Without such a servitude, a prudent land trust
could not make substantial investments in rehabilitation of land owned
by another.
Elmendorf has raised the likelihood that land trusts that want to
invest in active rehabilitation programs but cannot acquire a fee-simple
interest in the land face serious problems of opportunistic behavior. He
makes some interesting suggestions for designing pricing and
negotiation strategies to overcome these problems, but I do not believe
these strategies will provide sufficient security for the investment.
Fortunately, he also advances some excellent ideas about how to
structure long-term servitudes that will provide a sound legal alternative
when ownership of a fee simple is not feasible or desirable. If the land
trust can persuade landowners that they want to give up their
development rights, then his proposals for stretching out payment over
the life of the project and providing a process for the trust to acquire
additional use restrictions in the future should reduce the land trust's
exposure to risks of opportunistic behavior by landowners to an
acceptable level. It could also reduce the risks of opportunistic behavior
by the land trust to a level acceptable to the wary landowner.

